Book Review: Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe About Civil Liberties. by Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill. by Levinson, Sanford
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1985
Book Review: Dimensions of Tolerance: What
Americans Believe About Civil Liberties. by
Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill.
Sanford Levinson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Levinson, Sanford, "Book Review: Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe About Civil Liberties. by Herbert McClosky
and Alida Brill." (1985). Constitutional Commentary. 977.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/977
512 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:512 
DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS 
BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES. By Herbert Mc-
Closky! and Alida Bril1.2 New York: The Russell Sage Foun-
dation. 1983. Pp. x, 512. $29.95. 
Sanford Levinson3 
Dimensions of Tolerance 4 is primarily a report on two studies 
undertaken in 1976-77 and 1978-79 of American attitudes about 
various issues defined by the researchers as involving "civil liber-
ties." As a report the book is undoubtedly of great interest. In spite 
of inevitable methodological problems, it offers significant insights 
into the structure of popular opinion concerning issues that are cen-
tral to any society that defines itself as a liberal democracy. 
Less happily, however, I believe that the book also epitomizes 
some of the confusions, if not outright incoherence, found in much 
contemporary invocation of the term "civil liberties." Moreover, 
the authors make assumptions throughout their book about what 
people should believe without ever establishing a framework of jus-
tification as to why people should hold such views. Constant refer-
ence is made to our constitutional tradition as if its content were 
undebatable or, even more seriously, as if the Constitution were 
self-justifying. Neither, of course, is the case, and the failure ade-
quately to recognize these rather obvious points seriously weakens 
the book. 
I shall treat each of these points in tum. 
I 
The primary source for the conclusions about popular attitudes 
is a Civil Liberties Survey (CLS) conducted in 1978-79. A national 
sample of almost 2000 adults plus an additional group of almost 
1900 "community leaders and activists"s were asked to answer an 
extensive questionnaire detailing their views about a plethora of is-
sues. An earlier Opinion and Values Survey (OVS) had been con-
ducted in 1976-77 on a national cross-sample of 938 respondents, 
supplemented by almost 3000 elite respondents chosen from mem-
1. Research Director at Survey Research Center, Berkeley; Professor of Political Sci-
ence, University of California, Berkeley. 
2. Program Director and Scholar in Residence, Russell Sage Foundation. 
3. Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. 
4. H. McCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS 
BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983). 
5. ld. at 25. 
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bership lists of national organizations and listings in Who's Who 
and the Black Who's Who.6 These two surveys, in a conjunction 
with the authors' integration of earlier studies of popular attitudes 
toward civil liberties, undoubtedly constitute the most ambitious ex-
amination undertaken of the topic. 
Perhaps the major theme of the book is the greater tolerance of 
community leaders and activists as compared with the public at 
large. Indeed, "participation in the elite roles of the society exerts 
an influence over and above the influences of education, status, 
place of residence, and other social characteristics." The authors 
hypothesize that participation in public affairs serves to "expose one 
to a wider range of influence that increase social learning and pro-
duce greater familiarity with the prevailing values of the political 
culture," and it is a central tenet of the book that that political cul-
ture is "predominantly libertarian."? Part of the reason for greater 
tolerance, of course, may lie in the experience of having to work and 
deal with people of sharply differing views. Part of what it means to 
be a member of the elite, after all, is that one has the opportunity to 
move more often beyond the parameters (and limitations) of one's 
immediate surroundings. 
If community leaders are generally more civil libertarian than 
the mass public, one group trumps even the former in their devotion 
to those norms-lawyers. With extremely few exceptions lawyers 
consistently register more support for what the authors define as 
civil libertarianism than either the public at large or the nonlawyer 
elite sample. Thus only 20% of the legal elite would ban sexually 
explicit novels from high school libraries, as compared with 35% of 
community leaders and 48% of the mass public.s Eighty percent of 
the lawyers would grant college students the unfettered freedom to 
invite speakers to their campuses, whereas only 60% of the commu-
nity leaders would be so latitudinarian. Indeed, 26% of the latter 
support screening speakers "to be sure they don't advocate danger-
ous or extreme ideas," as compared with only 12% of the lawyers. 
A full 45% of the mass public supports such screening.9 
Perhaps the most dramatic difference between the lawyers' sen-
sibility and that of other segments of society regards the fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination. Ninety-three percent 
of the lawyers agreed that "[f]orcing people to testify against them-
selves in court is never justified, no matter how terrible the crime." 
6. See id. at 25-27 for a brief description of the two surveys. 
7. /d. at 253. 
8. /d. at 60. 
9. /d. at 56. 
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Only 40% of the mass public-and 67% of the community lead-
ers-were willing to subscribe to such a categorical statement.IO 
This last example, about which I shall have more to say below, 
underscores the extent to which lawyers may be well-socialized into 
expressing support for existing constitutional norms. "By training 
and vocational leanings," McClosky and Brill write, "lawyers are 
more disposed than any other segment of the population to adjust 
their beliefs to the rulings of the higher courts."u The strongly 
libertarian thrust of the Warren Court certainly helped to create a 
somewhat libertarian bar. (Is it too parochial to suggest that the 
strong liberal presence in the legal academy also helped to en-
courage students to accept the legitimacy of what, to the older bar, 
were extremely controversial forays into judicial policy making?) 
McClosky and Brill themselves suggest that "one must at least 
consider the possibility that if the courts were to become less liber-
tarian, many lawyers would also move in that direction."I2 This apt 
reminder points to one of the central, though unavoidable, method-
ological problems of the book-its time-boundedness. Both the 
OVS and CLS were conducted before the election of Ronald Rea-
gan and the inauguration of the so-called Reagan revolution. 
Surveys today might well reveal significant movement rightward, as 
antilibertarian opinions have become legitimized by their enuncia-
tion from the nation's highest offices. 
One wonders also how many of the OVS and CLS leaders were 
drawn from the ranks of the so-called "New Right" organizations 
that are playing such a significant role in the politics of the 1980's. 
Do the activists of the "Moral Majority," for example, reveal the 
same relative levels of tolerance as compared with the mass public? 
McClosky and Brill cannot be faulted for having failed to read the 
future when compiling their samples in the mid- and late-1970's, 
but the reader must always be aware of the peril of using their re-
sults to understand the 1980's. 
Returning to the subject of lawyers' commitment to civil liber-
ties, one may especially wonder about the implications of a second 
Reagan administration and of a Reagan-selected Supreme Court. If 
the level of support of lawyers for civil libertarian or due process 
norms is a function of their support by the judiciary, then there may 
be radical changes ahead. Insofar as many law students are content 
to parrot the judiciary rather than engage in genuinely independent 
thought, the bar of the future may be significantly different from the 
10. Id. at 158. 
11. ld. at 419. 
12. Id. 
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bar that came to consciousness in the last two decades. Indeed, 
those of us who teach constitutional law will be forced more than 
ever to decide how much our task is simply socializing students into 
acceptance of legal norms as articulated by the Supreme Court, as 
opposed to fostering a much more critical, much less positivistic, 
understanding of what constitutes "the Constitution." 
At the empirical level, then, McClosky and Brill present an 
image of the American polity that reveals sharp disagreement con-
cerning the desirable level of civil liberties within our society. The 
book offers no solace to populists, for the mass public emerges as 
only partially committed to what most readers of this review pre-
sumably would regard as many of our basic norms. 
Instead, corroborating earlier studies, McClosky and Brill find 
that members of elite groups, especially lawyers, are the supporters 
of the protection of diverse views and the rights of criminal defend-
ants. All of these comparisons, of course, are relative. The 1980's 
seems to be featuring the coming to power of anti-civil libertarian 
elites whose base of power is a populist resentment of cosmopolitan-
ism. Still, time-bound or not, the data presented in Dimensions of 
Tolerance amply reward the reader who wishes to understand more 
about American society. 
II 
McClosky and Brill treat freedom of speech, sexual freedom, 
the rights of criminal defendants, and prisoners' rights as civil liber-
ties issues. Their only attempt to define "civil liberties" is their 
comment that "we have reserved the term 'civil liberties' for those 
rights which have mainly to do with thefreedom of the individual." 
Among such rights purportedly is the right "to be free to live by 
whatever moral, sexual, and familial standards one prefers."B To 
put it mildly, though, this last clause opens up a Pandora's box of 
problems. 
In his valuable work on the theory of freedom of speech, Fred-
erick Schauer has pinpointed the difficulty of cordoning off a closed 
set of protected civil liberties from the more general set of all claims 
of personalliberty.I4 Insofar as much modem civil libertarian the-
ory is based on notions of "freedom of expression," the separation 
from general libertarianism becomes close to impossible. Since 
Schauer is neither a libertarian nor, equally important, a proponent 
of the view that the Constitution incarnates libertarianism, he is 
13. /d. at 326 (emphasis in original). 
14. See F. ScHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 60-72 (1982); see 
also Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1284 (1983). 
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wary of the path taken by many contemporary theorists. Dimen-
sions of Tolerance, though not an explicitly theoretical work, offers 
added support for Schauer's concern. 
Throughout their book McClosky and Brill regularly refer to 
"civil liberties" and to "libertarian values" and the "libertarian 
norms of the political culture."Is As a sometime historian and 
teacher of American political thought, I confess a degree of skepti-
cism about these confident assertions about the underpinnings of 
our political culture. As Garry Wills once remarked, "Running 
men out of town on a rail is at least as much an American tradition 
as declaring unalienable rights." I6 Yet my qualms about their anal-
ysis run even deeper, for the terms they use are hopelessly unclear. 
Bigamy, the use of heroin (or Laetrile), the sexual exploitation 
of teenagers, and employment below the minimum wage can all be 
defended within the ambit of some theory of liberty. None is prop-
erly considered a civilliberty.I7 Nothing in the book, however, al-
lows the reader to determine with confidence why these are not 
within the authors' ambit of concern. 
McClosky and Brill seem unaware that "civil liberties" may 
not be a synonym for "libertarian values." Although they are not 
constitutional scholars, they should certainly be aware that the basis 
of such decisions as Lochner v. New York Is and Coppage v. Kansasi9 
was the "libertarian" value of "freedom of contract." Contempo-
rary libertarians such as Robert Nozick have vigorously revived the 
tradition of libertarian natural rights associated with Justices Field 
and Peckham. This latter-day libertarianism seeks to delegitimize 
the modem welfare state. Taxation for purposes of redistribution is 
denounced as theft, and many other protective laws are dismissed as 
paternalist. 
Perhaps the authors are in fact closet libertarians. Yet the tone 
of the book, plus their failure to test popular attitudes towards the 
progressive income tax as an incursion on individual liberty, leads 
15. See. e.g., H. McCLOSKY & A. BRILL, supra note 4, at 232, 236, 238. 
16. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 60 (1980) (quoting Garry Wills). 
17. For what it is worth, I would tend to define "civil liberties" as those rights neces-
sary to maintain a "republican form of government." These can include not only traditional 
"negative liberties" like the freedom to speak and write without fear about the acts of govern-
ment and other influential institutions, but also certain "affirmative rights" ranging from the 
right to vote to some kind of "right to know" about the activities of the state. See, e.g., M. 
YUOOF, WHEN GoVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983). The problem with this definition is not only 
that it excludes, say, protection of "privacy," but also that it has only an uncertain role for 
limiting the rights of the state to engage in censorship of culture, as with antipornography 
legislation. 
18. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
19. 236 U.S. I (1915). 
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the reader to suspect that McClosky and Brill are more conven-
tional liberals. 
The typical member of the ACLU, I suspect, supports both 
"civil liberties," including protection of "privacy" and "freedom of 
expression," and the modern interventionist, redistributive state. 
The typical member of the "New Right," I also suspect, embraces 
economic libertarians while supporting active state regulation of 
sexual and reproductive practices. An undue consistency may in-
deed be the hobgoblin of small minds, but one nonetheless may be 
allowed to wonder at the range of begged questions presented by 
purported devotees of liberty, whether general or simply "civil." 
Dimensions of Tolerance, however, does not seem even to recognize 
that there is a problem of consistency that must be addressed. 
Noting that the case for tolerance is not "intuitively obvious," 
McClosky and Brill point to potential problems raised by protecting 
racist speeches by members of a white majority or the printing of 
lies by a newspaper or by forbidding public schools to set aside time 
and facilities for prayers. "Whether these and other liberties that 
exact a high price ought to be constitutionally protected raises 
highly vexing questions, and a fair amount of political sophistica-
tion is required to address them and make the case for freedom. "2o 
In all candor, the authors seem neither particularly vexed nor so-
phisticated enough to argue "the case for freedom" against a knowl-
edgeable opponent. 
Consider, for example, the data reported above concerning 
support for the right against self-incrimination, a right that the au-
thors seem wholeheartedly to embrace. Although I consider myself 
a strong civillibertarian,21 I have grown increasingly dubious of the 
value of the fifth amendment insofar as it prohibits requiring a de-
fendant to testify in open court22 or, at the least, permitting the 
prosecutor or judge to comment on the failure to testify. As I have 
argued elsewhere,23 I believe that the fifth amendment has gener-
ated enormous side costs by encouraging methods of investigation, 
including infiltration by secret police, far more damaging to the val-
ues of civil libertarians than would be the calling of a criminal de-
fendant to the stand. Thus I confess my agreement with the 60% of 
the presumptively unenlightened mass public that refused to agree 
20. H. MCCLOSKY & A. BRILL, supra note 4, at 375. 
21. I recently represented, on behalf of the ACLU, the Ku Klux Klan when Austin, 
Texas, refused the Klan a parade permit. 
22. I completely support Mirando and other impediments to out-of-court interrogation. 
It is the ban on in-court testimony that I find dubious. 
23. See Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, 12 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., August 1982, at 29-37. 
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that "[f]orcing people to testify against themselves in court is never 
justified, no matter how terrible the crime." I do not, however, feel 
any less the civil libertarian for having this view. 
This is only one of many examples that could be given of the 
difficulties of deciding what it means to be genuinely civil libertarian 
in today's world.24 The authors sound like the academics they are 
when they lament the "low levels of support for academic free-
dom," as manifested by the failure of the American public "to have 
conclusively decided that the education of the young should be the 
exclusive province of educators."2s The authors seem not to realize 
that "proper education of the young"26 is an inherently controver-
sial concept, or that limiting the rights of parents to control their 
children's education might itself raise profound problems of civil 
liberties. Instead, the book manifests an intellectual complacence 
about their own ill-defined and scarcely argued views together with 
a sense of alarm at the failure of most Americans to share those 
views. 
As it happens, I am also discouraged by reading the data col-
lected by McClosky and Brill for, notwithstanding the fifth amend-
ment, I am in basic agreement with most of their apparent 
positions. But I am afraid that the book will quite understandably 
fail to impress readers not predisposed to be sympathetic. Indeed, I 
suspect that at least some readers will be relieved to discover the 
weak popular support for some of our most important liberties. 
Despite the authors' insensitivity to the problems raised by 
their undeveloped assumptions, Dimensions of Tolerance is impor-
tant precisely insofar as it demonstrates the uncertain hold of many 
important values on the American political consciousness. Even its 
central defects are important insofar as they underscore the neces-
sity for those of us who do support (at least most) traditional civil 
liberties to develop much more cogent arguments directed at skep-
tics rather than merely to celebrate our own enlightenment or la-
ment the coming to power of the presumptively unenlightened. 
24. I am writing this review in Jerusalem, where two days ago a Jewish terrorist appar-
ently fired an antitank weapon at an Arab bus, killing one of the passengers. Among the 
responses was that of the racist thug (and member of the Knesset) Meir Kahane, who praised 
the act. Kahane has also sought to enter Arab villages in order to encourage their members 
to leave the country of which they are citizens. Defender of the (basically powerless) Klan 
though I may be, I find myself questioning how much freedom of speech should be allowed 
Kahane within the context of the continuing tragedy that is Israeli politics. Perhaps occa-
sionally there really are "clear and present dangers," however resistant we should properly be 
to invoking that term against our political adversaries. 
25. H. McCLOSKY & A. BRILL, supra note 4, at 57. 
26. /d. at 58. 
